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Background: The conflict in Syria is the largest driver of displacement worldwide with 4.1 million Syrian refugees,
more than 6.5 million internally displaced people (IDPs), and 13.5 million people in need (PiN) of protection and
humanitarian assistance inside Syria. Over the past decade, cash-based interventions (CBIs), including both
conditional and unconditional cash transfers and voucher programs, have become increasingly common. While the
cash-based response within Syria to date has been small compared to in-kind assistance, there is widespread
interest in expanding the use of CBIs. This study explores the feasibility of cash-based modalities with the aim of
informing future humanitarian assistance delivery strategies in northern Syria.
Methods: The feasibility of CBIs is examined in terms of acceptability, infrastructure, humanitarian agency
implementation capacity, value for money, risks, and responsiveness to changes in beneficiary needs. A mixed
methods approach was used consisting of a literature review in addition to a household survey and key informant
interviews (KIIs) conducted in early 2016 in four governorates of Syria (Aleppo, Hama, Idlib, and Al-Hasakeh).
Results: Overall, 64.5% of surveyed households received assistance during the 4-month period from October 2015
through January 2016. In-kind assistance was most common, with 59.2% of households receiving in-kind food aid.
More than half of households received only one or two distributions of assistance in any form. Unmet needs were
ubiquitous, and food was the priority in 74.1% of households. Despite relatively limited coverage of cash and
voucher assistance programs to date, stakeholders voiced a widespread preference for cash transfers as did
household survey participants. When analyzed by sector, cash assistance was preferred by survey respondents for all
sectors except WASH. The most significant challenge in implementing CBIs in Syria is the lack of a regulated cash
transfer system for movement of funds into the country. The bulk of humanitarian money is currently transferred
through informal value transfer networks (hawala), which appears to have the capacity to handle larger-scale cash
transfer programming. Technical guidance and standardized procedures are needed to ensure due diligence is
conducted to mitigate fiduciary risks and ensure accountability to both beneficiaries, donors, and other
stakeholders.
Conclusions: The possibility of more sustained, continuous assistance provided through cash transfer or voucher
mechanisms negates many of the barriers faced in providing in-kind assistance. Consideration of the feasibility of
cash as an alternative modality relies on local-level assessment of capacity, resources, political environment,
beneficiary needs and preferences, and lessons learned from previous programs in those areas.
Keywords: Syria, Humanitarian assistance, Cash-based, Cash transfers* Correspondence: doocy1@jhu.edu
Johns Hopkins School of Public Health, 615 N Wolfe St, Baltimore, MD 21205,
USA
© The Author(s). 2016 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Doocy et al. Journal of International Humanitarian Action  (2016) 1:13 Page 2 of 13Introduction
The conflict in Syria is the largest driver of displacement
worldwide with an average of 50 Syrian families dis-
placed every hour of every day since 2011 (UNHCR
2015). In addition to 4.1 million Syrian refugees, there
are more than 6.5 million internally displaced people
(IDPs) and 13.5 million people in need (PiN) of protec-
tion and humanitarian assistance within Syria; the largest
concentrations of PiN and IDPs is in the governorates of
Aleppo, Rural Damascus, and Idlib (OCHA 2015a;
OCHA 2015b).
The humanitarian response in Syria is complex with
assistance delivered from multiple hubs (inside Syria
as well as from Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq)
and coordinated under the Whole of Syria Approach.
Numerous UN agencies, international organizations,
and local and international non-government organiza-
tions (NGOs) are engaged in protection and humani-
tarian assistance efforts which will target 13.5 million
people and require $3.18 billion in funding in 2016
alone (OCHA 2016). There have been significant
challenges in both the humanitarian and security situ-
ation since the beginning of the crisis. All parties to
the conflict disrespect obligations under international
humanitarian law, which has resulted in targeting of
civilian infrastructure, absence of protection, and de-
nial of humanitarian access (OCHA 2016). Provision
of in-kind aid has been subject to security and logis-
tical constraints, which challenges the assumption
that it is the most secure and reliable modality in the
Syrian context.
The majority of humanitarian assistance in Syria and
worldwide is provided as in-kind aid. However, over the
past decade, cash-based interventions (CBIs) have
become increasingly common. Examples of cash-based
interventions include both unconditional and multipur-
pose cash transfers, cash transfers with eligibility
conditions (including cash for work), and vouchers that
can be exchanged for specific items, services, or cash.
When designed well, cash can be more effective, effi-
cient, and acceptable to beneficiaries than in-kind assist-
ance, though the efficiency of cash compared to in-kind
assistance can vary significantly and depends on trans-
portation and storage costs as well as local market prices
(Doocy et al. 2015; Harvey and Bailey 2015; Gairdner
et al. 2011).
The cash-based response within Syria to date has been
small compared to in-kind assistance, and coverage has
been limited. With respect to CBIs coordinated from
Turkey, vouchers have been used to support communi-
ties with access to food, livelihoods, non-food items, and
maternal health services (OCHA 2016) Cash transfers
have been a less-used modality. The most widespread
use of cash transfers in 2015 was in food security andlivelihoods, with cash provided to selected households in
12 sub-districts over a 3-month period. Cash programs
for water and sanitation, shelter, and non-food items
were implemented on a smaller scale, with transfers
provided in less than eight sub-districts over a 1- to 2-
month period. There is widespread interest, however, in
expanding the use of CBIs (Save the Children 2016).
Perhaps the most significant challenge in implementing
cash-based responses in Syria is the lack of a functional
electronic banking system or regulated cash transfer sys-
tem for movement of funds into the country. Currently,
many organizations use hawala or informal “value trans-
fer” networks to transfer funds into Syria to reimburse
voucher vendors, which poses legal and other concerns.
Hawala brokers operate either in parallel to or in the ab-
sence of formal bank money transfer systems and may or
may not be registered with local or national governments.
Through hawala, an individual or organization wishing to
transfer money approaches and provides the transfer
amount to a local hawala broker. This broker then
contacts a hawala broker in the recipient’s location, and
through use of a security code, most often delivered by
SMS or phone, the recipient can collect the transfer from
the hawala broker in their location. This system relies on
trust between brokers and tracking of debts among
brokers and does not necessitate physical movement of
cash, written contracts, or promissory notes. The import-
ance to brokers maintaining their standing and trust in
their trading network provides assurance to those using
the hawala system (Beachwood International 2015a;
El-Qorchi et al. 2003).
As the conflict in Syria continues, there is need for
widespread response focused on urban areas that ad-
dresses humanitarian needs and promotes resilience
(OCHA 2016). This includes sourcing assistance from
within Syria rather than importing in-kind assistance, in-
terventions to support job creation and rehabilitation of
industry and local markets, and empowering beneficiar-
ies with choice in what assistance they receive. This
study explores the feasibility of CBI modalities and bene-
ficiary preferences with the aim of informing future hu-
manitarian assistance delivery strategies in northern
Syria.
Methodology
This study was designed to assess the feasibility of CBI in
terms of acceptability, infrastructure, humanitarian agency
implementation capacity, value for money, risks, and re-
sponsiveness to changes in beneficiary needs. A mixed
methods approach was used that consisted of a household
survey, key informant interviews (KIIs), and a literature
review. The geographic scope of the study was limited to
four governorates with reasonable security and an ongoing
cross-border response from Turkey (Aleppo, Hama, Idlib,
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identified based on a security assessment, and communi-
ties (n = 478) within those sub-districts were assigned a
risk level based on the number of security incidents in the
last quarter of 2015 (Global Communities 2016). The
majority of communities (78.7%) were classified as low
risk; an additional 17.2 and 4.2%, respectively, were
acceptable risk and moderate/high risk. The feasibility of
cash interventions by risk level was a priority research
question; as such, a stratified sample was used to ensure
adequate representation from communities of all risk
levels. For the household survey, 25% of participants
were from high/moderate-risk communities, 25% from
acceptable-risk communities, and 50% from low-risk com-
munities; the key informant sample from within Syria was
similarly structured and drawn from the same communi-
ties included in the household survey (Fig. 1).
The household survey had a 20 cluster × 20 household
design (n = 400 households). Within each risk category,
probability proportional to size sampling was used to allo-
cate clusters first at the governorate level, then at the
district level, and finally at the sub-district level. OneFig. 1 Accessible sub-districts and sampled locationscommunity from within each sub-district was randomly
selected as survey location; two locations were replaced
due to inaccessibility during the survey. Within each
community, two locations were visited and ten interviews
conducted. Starting locations were determined by seg-
mentation, where households near the centers of opposite
quadrants of the community were used as cluster start
points. Replacement sampling was used for households
not at home. Only adult respondents were eligible to par-
ticipate, and oral consent was obtained. Participation was
anonymous, and unique identifying information was not
collected. Interviewers were Syrian and were recruited in
each governorate. All interviewers received training and
were provided with a field guide; interviewers were super-
vised directly by team leaders as well as remotely by other
members of the study team. The questionnaire was devel-
oped in English and translated to Arabic; the translation
was then reviewed by multiple team members before a
consensus version was finalized. The survey was con-
ducted on smartphones using Magpi, a mobile data plat-
form by Datadyne LLC (Washington, DC), and analyzed
using the Stata 13 software package (College Station, TX).
Doocy et al. Journal of International Humanitarian Action  (2016) 1:13 Page 4 of 13The Stata “svy” command was used to adjust for design ef-
fects. Chi-square and t tests were used for comparison of
proportions and means.
Group and individual KIIs were conducted to capture
the perspectives and experiences of donors, Syrian NGOs
and international NGOs (founded and with headquarters
located outside of Syria) implementing humanitarian
assistance programs, local councils, and community mem-
bers (including both current beneficiaries and those who
had not received assistance). Additionally, several KIIs
were conducted with money traders in the hawala system,
wholesalers of goods (including humanitarian assistance),
and researchers. A total of 91 key informants in Turkey
and Syria were interviewed during the assessment includ-
ing 25 key NGO informants from 14 NGOs, 33 commu-
nity informants from 7 locations, 25 local council
informants from 5 locations, and 8 others including
donors, money transfer agents, and a wholesaler. Key
informants were identified in consultation with the Cash-
Based Response Technical Working Group (CBR-TWG)
for cross-border humanitarian assistance coordinated
from the Turkey hub. KIIs were conducted in person in
Arabic or English depending on respondent preference. A
notetaker was present, and at the conclusion of each inter-
view, the interviewer and notetaker reached consensus on
the final version of the notes. Key informant interview
data were analyzed using content analysis methods with
the aim of identifying key themes, consensus viewpoints,
and viewpoints of a minority (within groups) or that were
unique to certain contexts or locations.
The literature review aimed to contextualize primary
data and inform recommendations. Publically available re-
ports on humanitarian assistance in Syria and the region
published between January 2015 and 2016 were included;
in addition, peer-reviewed literature was searched; how-
ever, no relevant articles were found. Following the initial
search, documents were assessed to identify those con-
taining information about the topic areas for this assess-
ment. Documents were mapped to relevant topic areas
(acceptability, infrastructure, implementation capacity,
value for money, risk, flexibility/responsiveness), and find-
ings are presented with primary data by topic area. Results
from the household survey, KIIs, and literature review
were then synthesized using a Balanced Scorecard ap-
proach to consolidate findings from multiple perspectives
into an easily usable tool for decision-makers to under-
stand the acceptability, infrastructure, implementation
capacity, value for money, risks, and potential benefits of
expanding CBIs in northern Syria.
Permission was obtained from community leaders
prior to data collection. This study was reviewed by the
Johns Hopkins School of Public Health Institutional
Review Board and determined not to be human subjects
research.Results
Humanitarian needs and assistance
Assessing the feasibility of expanding CBIs to address
humanitarian needs in northern Syria involves myriad
considerations; first and foremost is an understanding of
humanitarian needs. Overall, 64.5% (CI 55.6–72.5) of sur-
veyed households received assistance during the 4-month
period from October 2015 through January 2016. In-kind
assistance was most common, with 59.2% (CI 51.9–66.2)
and 21.8% (CI 14.6–31.1) of households receiving food
and other items, respectively. Food and unrestricted
vouchers were received by 6.0% (CI 2.1–16.3) and 2.5%
(CI 0.5–12.5) of households, respectively, and unrestricted
cash assistance by only one household. More than half of
households (56.2%, CI 35.5–75.0) received only one or
two distributions of any type of assistance. Quantities of
food assistance were a challenge reported for both in-kind
and voucher assistance with perceptions of insufficient
quantities reported by 77.8% (CI 44.1–94.0) of food vou-
cher recipients and 78.1% (CI 70.9–83.8) of food item re-
cipients. Borrowing and asset sales in the month
preceding the survey were reported by 58.8% (CI 52.9–
64.4) and 34.5% (CI 25.8–44.4) of households, respect-
ively, indicating that many families are struggling to meet
basic needs. Unmet needs were ubiquitous, and food was
the priority in 74.1% (CI 66.3–80.6) of households. Table 1
and Fig. 2 present an overview of key survey findings on
humanitarian needs and assistance.
KIIs confirmed and reinforced survey findings, where
food was consistently identified as the greatest expense
or most pressing need; other unmet needs varied from
one community to the next but with no clear pattern.
KIIs illuminated numerous challenges in providing hu-
manitarian assistance and resulting tensions within the
community, including that assistance programs target
the most vulnerable households (IDPs, widows, house-
holds with many children, and the elderly) but do not
have sufficient resources to cover all households that
meet the inclusion criteria or to assist other poor house-
holds. Local council members explained how strict selec-
tion criteria and short distribution time frames can
hinder programs from reaching some of the most vul-
nerable and that perceived inequities can strain commu-
nity relations; some local council members suggested
tensions could be avoided if programs were designed to
benefit the whole community rather than selected
households.
Cash-based response feasibility
This study assessed potential for providing cross-border
cash assistance in northern Syria. The Feasibility
Scorecard (Table 2) synthesizes data from multiple pri-
mary and secondary data sources, organizes findings by
topical area (acceptability, infrastructure, implementation
Table 1 Humanitarian needs (January–February 2016) and assistance received (October 2015–January 2016)




(N = 400) (N = 100) (N = 100) (N = 200)
Number Point 95% CI Point 95% CI Point 95% CI Point 95% CI
Humanitarian vulnerability and needs profile
Household type
Affected 173 43.2% [32.6,54.6] 43.0% [22.6,66.1] 44.0% [23.0,67.4] 43.0% [29.0,58.2] 0.205
Displaced 106 26.5% [18.6,36.3] 13.0% [7.0,22.9] 39.0% [27.0,52.5] 27.0% [15.7,42.4]
Returnee 121 30.2% [18.4,45.5] 44.0% [24.7,65.3] 17.0% [7.9,33.0] 30.0% [12.6,56.1]
Households reporting asset sales in
the month preceding the survey
138 34.5% [25.8,44.4] 42.0% [26.2,59.6] 28.0% [21.4,35.7] 34.0% [20.5,50.7] 0.770
Households reporting borrowing
money or receiving credit in the
month preceding the survey
235 58.8% [52.9,64.4] 53.0% [39.7,65.9] 64.0% [56.7,70.7] 59.0% [50.9,66.6] 0.325
Households reporting lack of
food or money to buy food
in the preceding month
283 70.8% [62.0,78.2] 68.0% [59.8,75.3] 66.0% [56.2,74.6] 74.5% [57.5,86.3] 0.451
Households reporting any
unmet need
398 99.5 % [97.9,99.9] 99.0% [93.4,99.9] 99.0% [93.4,99.9] 100% 0.337
Highest priority unmet need
Food 295 74.1% [66.3,80.6] 66.7% [59.4,73.2] 74.7% [62.3,84.1] 77.5% [63.3,87.3] 0.761
Non-food items 51 12.8% [8.5,18.8] 19.2% [12.2,28.8] 14.1% [7.7,24.6] 9.0% [3.9,19.5]
Health 21 5.3% [3.5,8.0] 4.0% [1.6,9.6] 7.1% [4.1,12.0] 5.0% [2.5,9.7]
Water and sanitation 10 2.5% [0.9,6.6] 4.0% [1.2,12.5] 1.0% [0.1,6.6] 2.5% [0.5,12.1]
Others 9 2.3% [1.1,4.6] 2.0% [0.3,12.7] 2.0% [0.6,6.5] 2.5% [1.0,6.1]
Shelter 8 2.0% [0.8,5.2] 2.0% [0.6,6.5] 1.0% [0.1,6.6] 2.5% [0.6,9.6]
Education 3 0.8% [0.2,3.4] 1.0% [0.1,6.8] 0.0% 1.0% [0.1,7.3]
Livelihoods 1 0.3% [0.0,2.0] 1.0% [0.1,6.6] 0.0% 0.0%
Receipt of humanitarian assistance, October 2015–January 2016
Households receiving any assistance 258 64.5% [55.6,72.5] 59.0% [38.6,76.7] 62.0% [46.9,75.1] 68.5% [56.6,78.4] 0.584
Non-food items 87 22.5% [14.6,31.1] 21.0% [9.5,34.3] 25.0% [10.3,49.1] 22.0% [12.2,35.1] 0.846
Food basket/items 237 59.3% [51.9,66.2] 57.0% [38.8,73.5] 53.0% [44.1,61.7] 63.5% [53.8,72.2] 0.401
# of times received Mean 237 2.1 [1.8,2.3] 2.3 [1.7,2.9] 2.3 [2.1,2.5] 1.9 [1.5,2.2] 0.177
Food vouchers 24 6.0% [2.1,16.3] 8.0% [1.1,41.2] 2.0% [0.3,12.7] 7.0% [1.7,24.5] 0.607
# of times receiveda Mean 24 1.6 [1.4,1.9] 1.8 [1.8,1.8] 1 [1.0,1.0] 1.6 [1.3,2.0] 0.675
Value of voucher receiveda Mean 24 99.3 [76.4,122.1] 113.9 [113.9,113.9] 161.5 [161.5,161.5] 80.7 [63.4,97.9] 0.063
Unrestricted vouchers 10 2.5% [0.5,12.5] 1.0% [0.1,6.6] 0.0% 4.5% [0.7,23.7] 0.412
# of times receiveda Mean 10 1.6 [1.3,1.9] 1 [1.0,1.0] – 1.7 [1.4,1.9] 0.035
Value of voucher receiveda Mean 10 102.8 [81.0,124.5] 127.1 [127.1,127.1] – 100.0 [80.2,119.9] 0.139
Unrestricted cash transfer 1 0.3% [0.0,2.0] 0.0% 1.0% [0.1,6.6] 0.0% 0.735
Percent of household’s diet provided for by humanitarian assistance
None 116 29.0% [23.1,35.7] 32.0% [20.8,45.8] 35.0% [23.7,48.3] 24.5% [17.5,33.2] 0.586
0–24% 146 36.5% [30.7,42.7] 29.0% [21.0,38.5] 32.0% [24.7,40.2] 42.5% [34.0,51.4]
25–49% 68 17.0% [12.9,22.1] 20.0% [15.3,25.8] 14.0% [8.3,22.6] 17.0% [10.5,26.4]
50–74% 37 9.3% [6.5,13.0] 15.0% [9.4,23.1] 8.0% [4.3,14.5] 7.0% [4.1,11.8]
75–100% 32 8.0% [4.9,12.8] 4.0% [1.6,9.6] 11.0% [5.0,22.3] 8.5% [4.3,16.2]
aAmong households receiving this type of assistance; values reported in USD
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Fig. 2 Overview of humanitarian needs and assistance received
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ness), and highlights issues that vary by community risk
level or governorate.
Acceptability
Acceptability was examined in terms of beneficiary, local
council, NGO, and donor preferences. Despite relatively
limited coverage of cash and voucher assistance pro-
grams to date, the different stakeholders voiced a wide-
spread preference for cash transfers over in-kind
assistance or vouchers (Table 3). Household survey par-
ticipants were asked to identify specific types of assist-
ance they would prefer to receive as in-kind goods or
services, vouchers, and cash transfers. Overall, cash as-
sistance was preferred by the greatest number of survey
respondents (94.2%), followed by in-kind assistance
(91.0%) and vouchers (79.4%) (Fig. 3). When analyzed by
main sectors of action for the Whole of Syria Response,
cash assistance was preferred for all sectors except
WASH, for which respondents preferred in-kind
assistance.
Preferences expressed by community key informants
varied more than household survey findings, though most
expressed a preference for cash. For food assistance, cash
was preferred because in-kind food baskets may not pro-
vide the quantity or quality of items desired. Some key in-
formants noted a preference for cash assistance in USD or
in-kind assistance over the local currency because of de-
clines in the value of the Syrian pound. In one rural area,
preference for in-kind assistance was due to the small
number of shops with limited stock and no nearby hawala
agents. Consensus among community key informants was
that vouchers are the least appealing form of assistance
because vendors will raise prices; however, experience
with vouchers was limited, and shop monitoring can pre-
vent price manipulation (Doocy et al. 2016). Local councilmembers expressed a need for more consistent assist-
ance with broader coverage and raised a number of
concerns about vouchers, including that vendors may
raise prices or force the purchase of certain items, the
“hidden” transport costs incurred for travel to
contracted shops in rural areas, and the greater ease of
sharing in-kind assistance. Finally, participants in both
community and local council interviews expressed un-
met needs for programs with lasting impacts for the
community as a whole, such as employment opportun-
ities, rehabilitation of damaged infrastructure, and sup-
port for small businesses.
Staff from the CBR-TWG member organizations de-
scribed different levels of experience with each assist-
ance modality and challenges faced in implementation;
however, none expressed an explicit organizational pref-
erence for one assistance modality over another. There
was widespread agreement that CBIs are preferable to
in-kind assistance where markets are functioning. Some
NGO informants noted that cash-for-work programs are
most likely to be effective in addressing basic needs in
relatively stable communities whereas unconditional
cash transfers (if markets are functioning) or in-kind as-
sistance is more suitable for addressing the immediate
needs of displaced households. Many NGO key infor-
mants emphasized that program design considerations
like assistance modality and delivery mechanism should
be driven by beneficiary preferences and evidence of ef-
fectiveness, not NGO or donor preferences. The two
donor agency representatives expressed the understand-
ing or assumption that populations in Syria would prefer
cash assistance because of its flexibility. Neither were
funding CBIs or expressed plans to do so in 2016; how-
ever, within organizational policy constraints, both
expressed commitments to provide maximum flexibility
in selection of assistance modalities.
Table 2 Feasibility Scorecard





Beneficiary acceptance and preferences Widespread acceptance and preference for cash transfers,
supplemented by in-kind assistance only when essential items are
unavailable in local markets.
X YES
NGO acceptance and preferences Acceptance, preference, and readiness in theory but limited by
donor and organizational policies.
X X
Donor acceptance and preferences Acceptance in theory from major donors (EU, DFID, etc.) but no
explicit acceptance of working via the hawala system or clarity on
due diligence requirements needed to mitigate legal/fiduciary risks.
X X
Political/local council acceptance and
preferences
Cash-based assistance is acceptable to local councils. However,
many expressed preference for programs that benefit the
community as a whole, not individual households, and that could
have more lasting benefits for resilience and recovery.
X X
Infrastructure
Transfer mechanisms Hawala networks provide infrastructure needed to expand cash-
based responses to the Syrian crisis but are not currently
acceptable.
X X
Delivery mechanisms Cash and voucher delivery mechanisms are well established.
Preferred delivery mechanisms vary by risk level and governorate.
YES YES
Availability of markets for goods/services Markets are functioning in most areas of northern Syria, albeit with
fuel shortages in some areas and occasional stock-outs during
periods where high-risk areas are cut off by heavy fighting.
X X
Implementation capacity
Technical design/management International and Syrian NGOs currently providing assistance in Syria are
well positioned and have demonstrated capacity to provide cash-based
assistance, in coordination and with technical leadership from the CBR-
TWG. However, consensus on humanitarian community risk thresholds
and a common strategy for design, management, monitoring, and
evaluation of multisector cash-based assistance and complementary





Partnership management and coordination X X
Value for money
Economy Cash transfers are less costly than alternative assistance modalities. YES X
Efficiency Vouchers are more cost-efficient and cost-effective than in-kind food
assistance. However, they may be more susceptible to fraud or




Security risks Cash-based assistance is more discrete and thus may present fewer
security risks than in-kind assistance.
YES NO
Fiduciary risks The lack of common fiduciary risk thresholds and management strategies
are the humanitarian community’s greatest obstacle to expansion of
cash-based assistance modalities.
X X
Operational risks The CBR-TWG and NGOs have a clear understanding of operational
risks and are using innovative strategies to mitigate risks; scaling up
cash-based responses in a volatile environment may present new risks.
X X
Flexibility/responsiveness
Ability to meet changes in beneficiary needs Previous cash-based response programs were designed to respond
to emergency needs of particularly vulnerable populations, and the
reach of hawala networks suggests potential to expand cash-based
assistance efforts as needs arise. The ability for rapid implementation
of cash assistance programs depends largely on the organization’s
capacity to collect necessary data, identify and work with local
partners, and appropriately design context-specific program plans.
YES X
Ease of rapid phase-in/phase-out as substitute
for other modalities as needed
YES X
aInterpret with caution; the household survey was not designed to be representative of populations at the governorate level or to detect differences
by governorate
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Table 3 Stakeholder preferences for humanitarian assistance
Stakeholder preferences
Community members prefer cash transfers received via vendors/shops
or hawala agents in their community, supplemented by in-kind
assistance when needed to address fuel shortages and basic services
(e.g., primary education and basic health care).
Local councils prefer assistance with both immediate and potential
medium to long-term benefits for the community as a whole.
NGOs prefer assistance that is driven by beneficiary needs and
preferences, accepted by donors and local stakeholders, and can be
provided efficiently.
Donors prefer vouchers to cash transfers because they are easier to
track and evaluate, but assessment findings and lessons learned from
pilot projects suggest vouchers may provide the least value for
money from both beneficiary and NGO perspectives.
Globally, there is increasing interest in the potential for multipurpose
(unconditional) cash transfer programming with the aim of increasing
effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian assistance, but there is
well-founded hesitation or resistance to using informal money transfer
networks where there are risks of terrorism financing and money
laundering.
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Infrastructure for CBIs was examined in terms of avail-
ability of transfer and delivery mechanisms, as well as
markets for goods and services. The process of moving
currency and/or goods into Syria is a challenge; KIIs and
the document review identified only two mechanisms for
importing cash: physical carry across the border or trans-
ferring via informal hawala networks that rely on personal
connections between individuals in different locations to
deposit funds for the purpose of making an equivalent
payment to a third party without physically moving
money. The bulk of humanitarian money in Syria is cur-
rently transferred through hawala, and the system appears
to have the capacity to handle larger-scale cash transfer
programming (Beachwood International 2015a). When
asked to identify preferred delivery mechanisms for eachFig. 3 Assistance modality preferencesassistance modality, household survey respondents re-
ported preferring to receive cash assistance through a
local store/vendor (45.9%) or hawala agent (43.5%) and
preferring paper-based vouchers (52.4%) over electronic
vouchers (28.1%).
Globally, how markets function in crises is not well
understood, nor is the comparative impact of different hu-
manitarian assistance modalities on market dynamics. Re-
cent assessments indicate that functional food markets
exist in approximately 67% of sub-districts in Syria; 29% of
sub-districts had mostly functional markets, and less than
2% of sub-districts had very limited access to markets
(CBR-TWG 2015a). Monitoring data suggests that where
markets are functioning, key commodities and goods are
available, but there are occasional shortages localized in
areas cut off by heavy fighting for a temporary period
(CBR-TWG 2015a). KIIs confirmed that markets were
relatively functional; with the exception of fuel shortages
in some locations, availability of food and non-food items
was not mentioned as a concern. Increasing prices of food,
water, and fuel were raised as a major issue by all stake-
holders, and this finding aligns with market monitoring
reports (REACH 2015).
Implementation capacity
For the purposes of this assessment, implementation
capacity was examined in terms of technical expertise, fi-
nancial and logistics capacity, monitoring and account-
ability mechanisms, and approaches to partnership and
coordination. While numerous organizations have im-
plemented CBIs in other settings, there was little publi-
cally available documentation that provided insight into
national or international NGO capacity for designing
and managing CBIs within Syria. As noted by many key
informants, to implement assistance programs effectively,
humanitarian organizations need to have adequate capacity
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well as good understanding of feasible delivery mechanisms
in the specific operating environment. Ensuring appropriate
dissemination of CBI program data and findings across sec-
tors and organizations is central to adapting programming
based on implementation lessons learned, how assistance is
used, and remaining unmet needs.
Given the many risks associated with cash transfers,
monitoring and accountability mechanisms are an essen-
tial component of program implementation. The CBR-
TWG has demonstrated an in-depth understanding of
monitoring and accountability needs associated with
cross-border humanitarian assistance programming and
capacity to establish and refine systems to address evolv-
ing stakeholder needs and concerns (CBR-TWG 2015b).
Key components of monitoring and accountability in mul-
tisector cash-based response are a functioning grievance
and complaints system and a monitoring and evaluation
framework that tests the assumptions of cost-efficiency
and cost-effectiveness (Levine and Bailey 2015). Syria-
specific guidance on monitoring non-food item assistance
exists and includes a streamlined reporting system to be
used by all organizations to uniformly report and share
findings across the sector which will better inform pro-
gram design and implementation (NFI Sector Working
Group 2015). Given contextual constraints and the likely
expansion of CBIs, a similar approach would help to en-
sure reliable monitoring and feedback from beneficiaries;
the CBR-TWG is prioritizing standardized approaches to
assessment and evaluations and context-specific standards
in Syria which can help to guide the cash-based response
going forward (CBR-TWG 2015b).
Recent guidance on use of the hawala system for cross-
border assistance operations provides insight into the tech-
nical complexities and challenges of negotiating and coord-
inating with financial institutions and providers in Syria
(Beachwood International 2015a; El-Qorchi et al. 2003). En-
gagement with a money transfer agent and coordination
between organizations are essential for managing negotia-
tions and understanding appropriate commission rates.
The large informal money dealing sector in Syria is a major
challenge to CBIs; however, licensed money transfer busi-
nesses do operate in Syria which potentially could be used
by the humanitarian community and the CBR-TWG could
help to standardize these interactions.
Value for money
Value for money refers to optimal use of resources to
achieve the best outcomes and is often defined in terms
of 3Es: economy, efficiency, and effectiveness (Cabot
et al. 2015; DFID 2011). Economy relates to the price at
which program inputs are purchased; detailed analysis of
economic inputs for ongoing assistance programs was
beyond the scope of this assessment. Efficiency relates tohow well inputs are converted to the output of interest
and can be interpreted in many ways including timeli-
ness, consistency, and cost-efficiency. The CBR-TWG
members collaborate to conduct detailed information on
the availability and prices of key food items, non-food
items, and fuel in northern Syria on a monthly basis.
During late 2015 and early 2016, prices of nearly all
items increased again and again, and exchange rates var-
ied widely, with both variations by location and high
levels of volatility over time (CBR-TWG 2016). No stud-
ies have considered exchange rate volatility in evalua-
tions of intervention efficiency or compared the cost-
efficiency of cash transfers to vouchers and in-kind as-
sistance in Syria (Doocy et al. 2016). Effectiveness is the
extent to which an intervention achieves its intended
outcomes and impacts. Cost-effectiveness analysis com-
pares the relative costs of achieving desired social and/or
economic results with different interventions. A recent
study comparing in-kind food assistance, food voucher,
and unrestricted voucher programs in Idlib governorate
found that in-kind food assistance is more costly than al-
ternative modalities but may still be the most cost-
effective strategy for achieving specific objectives or the
only feasible option in some settings (Doocy et al. 2015).
These findings are consistent with global findings on
cash-based approaches in humanitarian emergencies
which concluded that how an intervention is designed
and implemented plays a greater role in determining ef-
fectiveness than the emergency context or sector of im-
plementation (Harvey and Bailey 2015).
For the purposes of this assessment, indications for
how the use of different assistance modalities may influ-
ence the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance were
sought. For the most part, stakeholder preferences for ei-
ther cash or in-kind assistance were driven by their per-
ception of intervention effectiveness in a given context.
Cash transfers were widely perceived as the most effect-
ive modality, assuming currency values remain relatively
stable. In-kind assistance was perceived as less effective
than cash transfers because beneficiaries may need to
sell some items received to purchase more needed items
and resale is likely to occur below market value. Finally,
voucher programs were perceived to be the least effect-
ive modality, not because of a lack of functional markets
or any objections to the way voucher programs are
intended to work but because of concerns that voucher
programs are more susceptible to fraud or manipulation
than other assistance modalities.
Risks
Given the widespread use of hawala networks for money
transfer, the security risks associated with CBIs in Syria
are no greater than those associated with alternative
forms of assistance. In fact, expanding CBIs may reduce
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and electronic vouchers are “low-profile” modalities that
may be less likely to attract attention to beneficiaries
than distribution of in-kind aid. Additionally, the ability
to transfer funds each month to existing beneficiaries re-
motely reduces challenges and security threats that may
exist with in-kind distributions and increases regularity
of aid. Neither community members, local councils, nor
NGO staff participating in key informant interviews
identified security or protection risks specific to cash
transfer or voucher program implementation.
Recent assessments suggest that hawala networks have
the capacity to transfer cash assistance on a broader
scale and have proven to be reliable in delivering funds.
There are also strong indications that markets have the
capacity to absorb this additional injection of cash. The
challenge remaining is how to determine what due dili-
gence and compliance mechanisms are needed to ensure
humanitarian assistance is not directly or indirectly
benefiting terrorism or money laundering. A more in-
depth understanding of fiduciary risks and greater
engagement with government authorities, regulatory
bodies, and financial/legal experts on many levels is
needed to mitigate and manage risks that assistance
could be delayed or interrupted.
Flexibility/responsiveness
The literature review undertaken for this assessment
yielded minimal evidence about responsiveness to bene-
ficiary needs, though a number of CBIs were designed to
respond to emergency needs of particularly vulnerable
populations and the reach of hawala networks suggests
potential to expand CBIs as needs arise. In the Syrian
context, rapid phase-in may not be as high of a priority
as quality design and implementation; however, it is still
critical for organizations to be able to design effective
and efficient assistance programs to meet beneficiary
needs as quickly as possible. Another key consideration
is appropriate planning during the design stage for a
defined exit strategy to phase out cash assistance when
programs end. Without local capacity to continue assist-
ance in the absence of the organization’s local presence,
the possibility for abrupt stoppage of assistance is great
and may have severe implications on beneficiaries and
future attempts at reinstating assistance. Exit strategies
should outline the criteria to determine when to begin
phasing out assistance; most often, this begins when
local markets recover to a sustainable level and income-
generating activities are available for beneficiaries. Be-
cause the time it takes for this criteria to be met in
protracted crises is often longer than organizations are
able to provide cash assistance, additional livelihood
components should be built into cash programming tosupport beneficiaries’ ability to meet their needs after
cash assistance ends (Mercy Corps 2015).
Cash-for-work (CFW) programming can lessen some of
the challenges with phasing in and out cash assistance.
CFW is a form of conditional cash transfer where benefi-
ciaries receive payment in exchange for work on needed
recovery activities including public work tasks, commu-
nity development activities, shelter repairs/construction,
and a number of other similar works. CFW can be rapidly
scaled up and provides an immediate means of transfer-
ring funds to vulnerable households while stimulating
local economies and contributing to cleanup efforts and
rehabilitation and development of community infrastruc-
ture; CFW can also be used when phasing out other assist-
ance programs. However, because experience with CFW
programs in Syria to date is limited, additional evidence is
warranted to make an informed decision about the appro-
priateness of this cash transfer modality in the Syrian con-
text (Solidarités International 2015; People in Need).
Discussion
Humanitarian agencies in northern Syria have the tech-
nical and operational capacity to expand CBIs provided
there is clarity on the legal and financial compliance
mechanisms. The presence of actors implementing CBIs
in Syria indicates that experience and knowledge exists
and is accessible through the CBR-TWG. The CBR-
TWG is effectively leading efforts to harmonize CBIs,
generate evidence to inform planning, and engage stake-
holders in dialogue about fiduciary risks and due dili-
gence requirements. Higher-level engagement and
consensus will be needed for any large-scale shifts in ap-
proaches to humanitarian assistance in the region. The
CBR-TWG is a central component of efforts to improve
coordination across sectors and organizations and can
help to ensure effective cash-based programming going
forward (CBR-TWG 2015b).
The security situation throughout Syria poses immense
challenges to both local and international actors providing
in-kind assistance to beneficiaries. The possibility of more
sustained, continuous assistance provided through cash
transfer or voucher mechanisms negates many of the
barriers faced in providing in-kind assistance. Consider-
ation of the feasibility of cash as an alternative to other
modalities relies on local-level assessment of capacity,
available resources, political environment, beneficiary
needs and preferences, and lessons learned from previous
programs in those areas. With all assistance modalities,
the continued devaluation of the Syrian pound, the
increase in food and non-food item costs (especially fuel),
the unpredictability of security conditions and associated
operating costs, and the lack of functional banking
systems within Syria create immense challenges in plan-
ning and budgeting for assistance programs. An assessment
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ation is essential to claim feasibility of CBIs as a substitute
for in-kind aid. In addition to market function, political
considerations must be taken into account when evaluating
the feasibility of cash as an alternative to other assistance
modalities. For example, cash assistance is not permitted in
government-controlled areas of Syria while vouchers and
in-kind aid are generally allowed; thus, cash assistance is
not a feasible alternative to other modalities (Beachwood
International 2015a; El-Qorchi et al. 2003).
Appropriate design of humanitarian assistance pro-
grams requires a keen understanding of whether CBIs
can meet specific needs of the target population. Deter-
mining the most appropriate targeting strategy and de-
livery mechanism requires organizational capacity to
understand the context, foresee potential risks, and de-
sign assistance in a way that effectively mitigates risks.
Tools to assess capacity to implement CBIs are available
within existing guidance and decisions on whether or
not to move ahead specific to the organization and con-
text for which the modality is being considered (Levine
and Bailey 2015; UNHCR et al. 2015).
Organizations must approach decisions about trans-
fer modalities with flexibility and be able to adapt to
locally determined needs as they arise, demonstrating
an ability to meet changes in beneficiary needs. While
the need for rapid implementation is not as great in
Syria as in rapid-onset crises, it is critical to appropri-
ately plan, during the design stage of assistance pro-
gramming, for a defined exit strategy to phase out
cash assistance when programs end. In conjunction
with other activities with a longer-term focus on im-
proving livelihoods and reducing use of negative eco-
nomic coping strategies, CFW programs may prove
beneficial to households by providing a short-term in-
come source. Given local council feedback that assist-
ance programming should be more community
oriented, CFW programs may be a desirable approach
because they improve community infrastructure and
coverage levels can be relatively high; thus, a larger
proportion of the community could benefit as com-
pared to other assistance with strict eligibility criteria.
Although cost-effectiveness and value for money are
increasingly considered as factors in design and evalu-
ation of assistance programs, many other political and
programmatic factors must also be taken into account.
There is no clear consensus among donors or other
stakeholders as to how to evaluate trade-offs in value for
money with other benefits (such as overall effectiveness,
beneficiary preferences, and lower risks). The costs and
cost drivers of cash, voucher, and in-kind assistance pro-
grams may vary substantially depending on the type,
size, complexity, duration, and location of the program,
level of management oversight and monitoring required,and other factors. In most settings, CBIs are less costly
than in-kind assistance (Harvey and Bailey 2015).
For the most part, donor and NGO preferences for ei-
ther cash or in-kind assistance seemed to be driven by
their perceptions of intervention effectiveness in a given
context. NGO key informants generally perceived cash
transfers to be the most effective modality for assisting
people in need within Syria. In-kind assistance programs
were perceived by NGO and donor key informants as
less effective than cash-transfers and voucher programs
were perceived as the least effective modality within
Syria, not because of a lack of functional markets or any
objections to the way voucher programs are intended to
work but because of additional management and moni-
toring systems that must be put in place to process
vouchers and prevent fraud or manipulation. To a large
extent, donor policies and preferred approaches for ad-
dressing humanitarian needs within Syria are governed
by global policy positions, funding approval mechanisms,
and reporting requirements.
Both in-kind assistance and cash transfer mechanisms
have major risks and limitations for the humanitarian
community. Turkish law requires cash withdrawn from
Turkish banks to be accounted for and spent within
Turkey, and physically carrying cash across the border
carries substantial security and legal risks. Hawala,
though well-established and widely available, is legally
restricted within Turkey, and the implications surround-
ing use of these systems for cross-border assistance re-
main unclear. While used on a widespread basis, there
are numerous risks and concerns associated with use of
the hawala system, in particular unrecognized brokers,
though the hawala system does appear to have the cap-
acity to handle larger-scale transfers if use was scaled up
by the humanitarian community. Recent guidance on
use of the hawala system for cross-border assistance
operations provides insight into the technical complex-
ities and challenges of negotiating and coordinating with
financial institutions and providers in Syria (Beachwood
International 2015a).
The large informal money dealing sector in Syria is a
major challenge to CBIs; however, licensed money trans-
fer businesses do operate in Syria which potentially
could be used by the humanitarian community and the
CBR-TWG could help to standardize these interactions.
Indications of openness to discuss donor and imple-
menting agency risk thresholds, potential for “formaliz-
ing” use of the hawala system for humanitarian
purposes, and engagement with governments to explore
ways of minimizing fiduciary, legal, and political risk in
cross-border fund transfers were emerging at the time of
this assessment (Beachwood International 2015b).
Fiduciary risks are risks that funds are not used for the
intended purposes, do not achieve value for money, or
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sistance to CBI because of risks around corruption and
potential diversion of cash are largely unfounded, in the
sense that risks of theft or fraud in CBI are no greater
than risks associated with in-kind humanitarian assist-
ance (Doocy et al. 2016). Fiduciary risks associated with
any type of humanitarian assistance in Syria, however, are
myriad and substantial. For example, a recent US govern-
ment report revealed that it did not provide the agencies
it funds with guidelines on fraud risk assessment and miti-
gation, that most of these agencies had not assessed the
risks of fraud within their operations, and that best prac-
tices in financial oversight are difficult to implement in
Syria due to the deteriorating security environment, lim-
ited access to PiN, and need to rely on remote manage-
ment and third-party monitoring of assistance programs
(United States Government Accountability Office 2016).
Risks that funds are misdirected, misused, or not properly
accounted for are not only risks that vulnerable popula-
tions do not receive the assistance they need but also that
humanitarian organizations are unintentionally providing
resources to the Assad regime or Islamic State of Iraq and
al-Sham (ISIS). Limited understanding of these risks and
lack of consensus on effective risk mitigation and manage-
ment mechanisms are likely the greatest barrier to expan-
sion of CBIs within Syria. Much work is still needed to
understand system dynamics and reach agreements on
acceptable risk thresholds for the humanitarian commu-
nity and what due diligence looks like in a system that is
largely unregulated by formal authorities and exposed
both directly and indirectly to money laundering and ter-
rorist financing activities. Expansion of cash transfer pro-
gramming within Syria will not be feasible without much
broader understanding of fiduciary risks by humanitarian
stakeholders at multiple levels (Beachwood International
2015a).
Primary data collection was limited to accessible areas
of northern Syria with ongoing cross-border humanitar-
ian assistance and may not be generalizable to inaccess-
ible areas or elsewhere in Syria. Further analysis of
assistance modalities is needed to ensure the most
appropriate, secure, and accountable options are chosen
in areas with ongoing or periodic cross-border humani-
tarian assistance from Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, includ-
ing both accessible and besieged areas. As with all
surveys, there is also a risk of response bias, particularly
in survey questions related to coping mechanisms such
as sale of humanitarian assistance. Nevertheless, this
assessment provides important insights into the issues
surrounding CBI in accessible areas of northern Syria
and can be used to inform future humanitarian assist-
ance strategies in this and other regions. The Whole of
Syria Food Security Sector has formed a Cash-Based
Response Feasibility Study Advisory Committee and iscommissioning a feasibility assessment in southern Syria
and other accessible locations to expand on the assess-
ment in the north (Food Security Cluster, 2016)
Conclusions
The international community has a responsibility to pro-
tect the people within Syria and assist them to meet
both immediate humanitarian and longer-term recovery
needs. As the conflict extends into the fifth year, new
approaches that will increase the reach, efficiency, and
effectiveness of response efforts and promote resilience
need to be adopted. This includes a shift away from in-
kind assistance towards a blended response including
more preferred CBI modalities and in-kind assistance
only where necessitated by sector-specific needs or con-
textual constraints. Cash-based approaches that should
be considered include multipurpose (unconditional) cash
transfers and cash-for-work programming that can gen-
erate employment and livelihood opportunities, rehabili-
tate infrastructure, and benefit local markets in addition
to addressing immediate humanitarian needs. Restoring
infrastructure and livelihoods can increase recovery op-
portunities for households and communities, potentially
reducing vulnerability and dependence on aid. Voucher
programs should be promoted only in circumstances
where less burdensome CBI modalities (e.g., multipur-
pose cash transfers) are not feasible; vouchers were the
least desired form of assistance because they are per-
ceived as more susceptible to manipulation.
Increasing responsiveness to beneficiary needs and
harmonizing response efforts through multiagency partner-
ships and supporting humanitarian agencies to strengthen
organizational structures and include administrative, finan-
cial, and logistics staff in all aspects of program planning,
management, and evaluation for cash-based assistance mo-
dalities will improve the humanitarian response. Develop-
ment of technical guidance and establishing standard
operating procedures for engagement with money transfer
agents across all humanitarian partners and appointment of
a high-level interlocutor to facilitate dialogue related to
fiduciary risk mitigation and management issues will im-
prove the feasibility and acceptability of cash-based pro-
gramming. Exploring the potential for creating common
standards and mechanisms for conducting due diligence on
money transfer agents and formalizing relationships with
money transfer agents or networks as partners in humani-
tarian assistance programming are also required if cash
transfer programming is to be achieved at scale in Syria.
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